Tag: nonfiction

Conflict is Not Abuse

While I was browsing Što čitaš? after I dropped off The House of the Dead, my gaze fell on Conflict is Not Abuse: Overstating Harm, Community Responsibility, and the Duty of Repair by Sara Schulman. What a relevant and potentially controversial premise! Praise on the back from Claudia Rankine and bell hooks! The only problem is that it was a bit of a chonker; moreover, the original English edition was easily available at the Stockholm library. Really, it wouldn’t have killed me to wait. But I was impatient and wanted to leave the store with something, so I figured, why not? As it turns out, Schulman’s Gentrification of the Mind was already on my TBR anyway. So it kind of counted, right?

Schulman’s thesis here is a bit complex. Her first argument is that the structure of private relationships, such as those in families or between lovers or friends, is the basis or model for the relationship between citizens and then state. Interpersonal and political conflicts are therefore analogous, or can at least be analyzed in similar terms. The second argument is that we often conflate “being uncomfortable” with “being in danger” (“overstating harm,” in her words) which leads to the claim Schulman makes right in the title of the book: many forms of “being uncomfortable” that are considered “being in danger” (whether by an abuser, the state, or a victim) should instead be thought of as either 1) literally Nothing (as in, one of the parties involved being triggered by something completely innocuous because of their own personal history), 2) Normative Conflict, or 3) Resistance. Overstating harm, Schulman argues, renders us unable to actually address the root of the issue. Her third argument is that the usual responses perpetuate more harm than whatever the inciting incident may have been.

With all of that established, Schulman then goes through four different approaches to conflict resolution that she believes provides a better alternative—historical psychoanalysis, Al-Anon, mindfulness, and pop psychology. A disparate group of frameworks, to be sure, but Schulman argues that all of them provide space for 1) pause and reflection in the moment (rather than immediate reactivity) as well as 2) accountability to a larger community. Throughout the book she illustrates her arguments with various case studies, from domestic violence and sexual assault to HIV disclosure laws in Canada to Israel’s occupation of Gaza, to demonstrate the various levels at which overstating harm and its consequences play out.

At this point, I will note that Schulman is not writing out of any particular academic discipline; her background is as a writer of literature, though also of nonfiction as well. She is up front about this and introduces the book and her argument as ideas she is offering up for consideration rather than a traditional academic examination (though she occasionally cites research and statistics when appropriate and includes a Works Cited section as well as citations by page).

Conflict is Not Abuse ended up being one of those books where the more I thought about it, the more mixed my feelings became. Schulman is very clear about her progressive bona fides right from the start because I think she’s perceptive enough to know that, at least from an unexamined surface level, her arguments are going to sound reactionary, or that she’s going to be excellent ideological cover for conservative talking points. (“Look at how this particular leftist is saying the same things about the left that we are!”) A quick Google leads to a glowing review from Heterodox Academy, for example, a group that I would feel safe saying is not in alignment with Schulman’s own values. It’s impossible to prevent that kind of reading or use of a text, however. The best you can do is what Schulman did: make it clear that you’re arguing from a specific position, in her case a queer leftist position including advocacy for people living with HIV and AIDS.

But there were other things that didn’t land well even when situated in that biographical context, with Schulman telling on herself in different ways. The first section, for example, could have well been titled Someone Had A Fight With Sarah Schulman Over Email Once And She Never Forgot. (The vibe was very similar to Bellwether in that vein: “A brash young person once asked Connie Willis to put out her cigarette in the 90s and she decided to write a whole book about it.”) As she sees it, emails and other forms of textual communication are the bane of all interpersonal conflicts today. Telephone calls and in-person conversations, meanwhile, are pure and holy and have never led to a single misunderstanding. This struck me strange as I was reading it, considering that Schulman foregrounds everything with her career as a writer and novelist—how could a professional and successful writer really believe that the written language is somehow insufficient and lacking in nuance? It only became stranger once I came to the section with her proposal for conflict resolution, the foundation of which is delay and reflection: taking a moment to choose words and reactions carefully. Isn’t that one of the advantages of written communication? That we can take all the time we need to say exactly what we want to say and to be able to revise it accordingly? That it can occur, if necessary, asynchronously? But then you realize: Schulman was 58 when Conflict is Not Abuse came out in 2016. Ah hah, Boomers and their predilection for phone calls.

Schulman also punctuates the book with personal anecdotes, both from her own life and those of people she knows. They soon begin to take on a sort of Goofus and Gallant tone, as Schulman always presents herself as an aspirational model of conflict resolution, whereas it’s always other people who escalate things unnecessarily. I understand not wanting to put your own painful or embarrassing mistakes out there for public consumption in a book for all eternity, but you can at least dial it back from being the Sarah Schulman Show and let other people be shining exemplars of conflict resolution. I think talking about the ongoing genocide in Palestine is important, but reproducing your Facebook posts and comments on it for pages and pages is the book equivalent of telling someone about this weird dream you had at length: it’s an exercise in self-absorption that is only interesting to you.

More seriously than just Schulman telling on herself, however, is a key point her larger argument. She (rightly) argues that people almost always have a reason and a motivation for doing what they do, even when the things they do are horrible. But then she pivots on that and argues that sometimes it’s not the person themselves but an outside observer who has the best insight into that reason. I suspect, but cannot prove, that this thesis seems largely uncontroversial to her because of her stated admiration for psychotherapy and psychotherapists; that she has a sort of paradigm where “good friends” (to use her words) are like gifted therapists who know what their friends’ problems are before their friends realize it themselves. That unexamined argument is where the book (partially) falls apart for me, because that’s the backdoor by which you can smuggle in all kinds of toxic nonsense. “You’re not trans, you’re just a tomboy.” “You’re not gay, you’re just brainwashed.” “I know you want it.” This single belief is the pernicious assertion that undergirds everything else toxic in this book.

To that end, someone should have been a good friend (or a good editor) to Schulman and told her: hey, you’re not coming across as your best self here. I don’t think it’s good or necessary to include these anecdotes. Here, I found some experts in these topics you’re covering, would you like them to review your material and talk to you about it? Schulman picked a sticky wicket to tackle, but in the end I don’t think she was quite equipped for it.

 

The House of the Dead

As a rule I generally pack light for my vacations, but this is always in favor of bringing too many books. The prospect of long hours of travel always inspires me to bring a selection, so that if my mood or attention span should shift, I’m more likely to have something suitable on hand. Plus there’s just the fact that I never want to feel like I “only” have one thing to read. Yes, there is Kindle (or the Kindle app, in my case) but sometimes phone battery is at a premium. Inevitably, then, I travel with at least two or three paperbacks, ideally ones without sentimental value so I can leave them behind (to make room for new books). Only sometimes, against my better judgment, do I bring library books or hardbacks that I was desperate to finish at that particular moment.

Nor can these books be just any random unread book off the shelf, either. A mysterious quality guides my hand, the “vibes” if you will. This is how I choose most things, actually—I have to bask in the collective presence of the options and contemplate them until one suddenly just feels right. The decision cannot be rushed or rationalized. Ice cream parlors with miles and miles of flavors were agony for me as a child (and no doubt for the parent accompanying me).

All of that preamble is to say that I can’t for the life of me explain why I chucked Dostoyevsky’s The House of the Dead into my bag beyond “the vibes.” Crime and Punishment was one of my favorite books out of my entire high school English career and afterwards I set about acquiring, but never actually reading, other works by Dostoyevsky. The next book of his that I read to completion was The Idiot last January—some twenty years later, in other words.

Where I struggled with The Idiot, I deeply enjoyed The House of the Dead. The character studies are more penetrating, more engaging, more revealing. The back of my Dover Thrift edition (ah, yes, Constance Garnett, my old friend!) describes the book as a “semi-autobiographical memoir,” which I take to mean as more or less true. The introduction purporting to be “oh look at these notes I just happened to find among a dead man’s papers” seems to be the plausible deniability cover-your-ass gloss of fiction over the rest of what’s to come.

The various prison personalities are interesting enough that you can overlook the lack of overarching plot or conflict. The narrator relates various observations that roughly correspond to a year, from winter to summer to winter again. Not really a strict chronological year, as such; it’s maybe akin to a thematic grouping, with several summers or winters collapsed into one, with a substantial chunk of time elided: Dostoyevsky himself served four years at a prison camp, and the self-insert narrator (Alexandr Petrovich) claims to have served ten. Petrovich acknowledges this gap and explains that he was the most observant and inquisitive during his first few months at the prison, so those memories are the strongest.

Since The House of the Dead is set in a Siberian prison camp, certain comparisons spring to mind. Not only Solzhenitsyn and One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich—the portraits of the various inmates reminded me a lot of Homeboy. Enough that I might send my Homeboy book buddy a copy of The House of the Dead. Preferably a newer translation than Garnett’s, though. Several have been put out since then, including Pevear & Volokhonsky! My own copy is now residing on the shelves of Što čitaš? in Zagreb, where it will hopefully find a second life.

Letters to a Young Poet

Who has two thumbs and is constitutionally incapable of going on vacation without purchasing a book or two? This girl!

I stumbled on Ivallan’s Secondhand and Exceptional Books on a quest to patronize the legendary Bei Slawinchen on a recommendation from a coworker. Bei Slawinchen didn’t happen, whether because it was closed for renovations or because I wasn’t cool enough to be let in (maybe both), but the trip out to Neukölln was worth it for Ivallan’s. Did I spend three hours browsing? Yes! Did the staff at any time pressure me to pay up and get out of the tiny space? No! Did they in fact help me locate an upcoming book club read? Yes! (I didn’t end up buying it, but paging through a couple chapters was enough for me to decide that it wouldn’t be for me.) I wandered around with various books in hand, waiting for my excruciatingly slow data connection to load library websites and my Storygraph TBR so I could check my spontaneous interests against books I was already planning to read or that I could borrow for free.

In the end I walked out with a novelty cross-stitch (“AWKWARD” in silver thread on green background), a bookmark I think I’ve already lost, and two slim volumes, one of which was the new Penguin Classics edition of Letters to a Young Poet, in a relatively new translation from German by Charlie Louth from 2011. Their collective weight was probably less than, or at most equivalent to, the copy of Wind, Sand and Stars that I had resigned myself to depositing at my hostel. Therefore, totally legitimate purchase: no net gain or loss.

On my last day in Berlin, I ended up sitting in a strandkorb at Tempelhof with some snacks and reading most of the book there, pausing occasionally to watch a family playing basketball. Contemplative. Idyllic.

A hundred years later, a lot has changed, but Rilke’s advice right from the third paragraph is still on point and perhaps the best advice any writer could get:

Go into yourself. Examine the reason that bids you to write; check whether it reaches its roots into the deepest regions of your heart, admit to yourself whether you would die if it should be denied you to write. This above all: ask yourself in your night’s quietest hour: must I write? Dig down into yourself for a deep answer. And if it should be affirmative, if it is given to you to respond to this serious question with a loud and simple “I must,” then construct your life according to this necessity; your life right into its most inconsequential and slightest hour must become a sign and witness of this urge.

Everything else is just details.

Wind, Sand and Stars

When I first read Le petit prince, I was in my author-obsessive phase and so immediately decided to find other books by de Saint-Exupéry. The high school library had Wind, Sand and Stars and I gave it a shot, but for one reason or another didn’t get more than a couple pages in before I gave up.

Then, last year on a trip back home, I saw a beat-up old copy at the Little Free Library someone had established on the porch of the post office. Why not try again? I picked it up, along with one or two others, and took them back to Sweden with me.

Now, a year later, I read it! Halfway through the year and this was the first book to qualify for my physical library quota. Oops.

I’m in the process of comparing the translation to the French original (which my local library happened to carry, hooray!). I’m not sure if substantial changes were made for the English translation, or if there are multiple editions available, because there are ten chapters in English and only eight in French, and I’m not sure that all eight of the French are even part of the English. As of writing I sat down and started re-reading one of the chapters that appears in both books, and even between those there are substantial differences. Whole paragraphs appear in the English that are nowhere to be seen in the French. Did Lewis Galantière take huge liberties with his translation? Was the French revised from one edition to the next? Unfortunately at the time of writing I’m practically on my way out the door so I’ll have to leave that question for another time.

As it exists in English, Wind, Sand and Stars doesn’t hit in the same way that Le petit prince does. There’s plenty of adventure and lyricism about the act of flying, the psychology of being a pilot…but there’s also plenty of French imperialism. You can expect or write off certain things as being “of their time” (and the original French came out in 1939), but when you have in your head the sensitivity, curiosity, and nuance of Le petit prince, it’s a bit of a shock to stumble across de Saint-Exupéry’s complete lack of interest in the Bedouins he describes—of its time or otherwise. To the extent he gives them any thought at all, it’s not much more than stereotype; French superiority isn’t ever stated outright but it’s there as background radiation.

That’s the only fly in the ointment, but unfortunately it’s a pretty big one. Big enough to chuck the book into the memory hole? No, of course not. But certainly big enough to detract from the magic of the rest of the book—including the near-fatal crash in the Sahara that led, years later, to Le petit prince, where de Saint-Exupéry and his mechanic were rescued from certain death by a passing Bedouin.

How to Be an Anti-Capitalist in the 21st Century

I read this one over the course of several months for a neighborhood book circle, even though it’s short and simple enough to finish in a couple of days. Erik Olin Wright intended this to be a quick introduction for laypeople, free of academic jargon and complicated arguments. Maybe stretching such a thin text over too long a time hampered my understanding of it, but by the end I felt like How to Be an Anti-Capitalist in the 21st Century didn’t deliver on the promise of its title.

I say this as someone who already fundamentally agrees with Wright’s larger project. But a how-to guide includes concrete steps and real-life examples to follow. Wright provides no instruction whatsoever, and for all of his theorizing about how different anti-capitalist (or simply not capitalist) groups and projects can be organized, the only specific example he mentions is Wikipedia. Contrast this with Chokepoint Capitalism, This is an Uprising or Rules for Radicals, which constantly refer back to real life protests and research, picking apart successes as well as failures. When hypothetical alternatives are floated to solve a current problem under capitalism, they are described in very precise terms. You come away from those books feeling prepared and capable of doing something.

A more appropriate title would probably be How to Think About Anti-Capitalism in the 21st Century, because what Wright does well in the volume is defining, categorizing, and organizing concepts. Instead of coming away from the book knowing what to do, I came away from it with better and more precise ways of articulating my ideas. This is by no means an unimportant part of the process of “eroding capitalism” (Wright’s own concept), but it’s not a fulfillment of the promise of the title.

How to Be an Anti-Capitalist… was intended to be accompanied by a denser, more scholarly text on the subject. Wright already had a heavy-hitting career as an academic and had been asked by various groups he’d organized with to write a more approachable popular text. He got that one out of the way first and then died from cancer before he could finish the bigger one. Perhaps that would have had the meat and potatoes I felt was lacking here.

Hemlös: med egna ord

I have mixed feelings about street papers as a solution for homelessness, but I still buy Situation Sthlm more often than not. It goes on the stack with the rest of my magazine subscriptions and then I read them all while I’m traveling, depositing them in seat pockets and airports as I go.

The most recent edition of Situation Sthlm, which I bought right before boarding a train to Norway, included a separate paperback anthology of the Med egna ord section of the magazine from 2015 to 2025—that is to say, writing from the magazine sellers themselves. It’s an interesting  collection to have, not least because it offers a more permanent space for writing than a monthly periodical.

Or, it almost does. The book is printed and bound like a proper paperback, all very professionally, but when you look closer you realize there’s no ISBN. Even the free copy of Bara ljuset kan besegra mörkret that I just randomly got in the mail one day has an ISBN, meaning it’s a registered entity in the larger bookseller ecosystem. How is this edition of Hemlös: med egna ord, never mind the previous two paperback anthologies, supposed to survive? No ISBN means you can’t hop on, say, adlibris.se and buy a copy two or three years after publication, if reading this blog post inspires you to buy it. One copy each of the 2008 and 2015 editions are available from the Stockholm public library, but that doesn’t feel like especially robust data security.

Not so permanent after all, perhaps.

The anthology consists of poetry or brief little biographical pieces and daily observations, so it’s not exactly citizen journalism. But it’s citizen literature, if such a concept exists—outsider art—and it would be a shame if it disappeared from the conversation because it wasn’t included in the system.

The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity

I first came across Kwame Anthony Appiah’s The Lies That Bind: Rethinking Identity in a friend’s Instagram story and thought, “Hm, this would be an interesting book.” And it was, but not in the way I had been hoping for.

Appiah examines the broader concept of identities in an opening chapter (“Classification”) and then breaks down five specific ways that people typically identify—creed, country, color, class, and culture—before giving some end remarks (“Coda”). In each chapter he highlights the inherent instability of these concepts, not just through abstract supposition but also by pointing to historical events and people, like Italo Svevo or Amo Afer, as case studies.

Perhaps the book wasn’t for me because I was already on board with how unstable these categories are. I wouldn’t be able to name any specifics, but I imagine that Appiah’s arguments in places (maybe especially in the chapters on country and color) were also made in Nell Irvin Painter’s A History of White People, which meant that they weren’t new ideas for me. The chapter on creed also left me particularly underwhelmed—Appiah gives a thorough and convincing explanation of why religions are more than just adherence to a particular sacred text, but it seems to be in response to a shallow Internet atheist style interlocutor. Yes, that specific understanding of “religious creed” as an identifier is indeed a bit wobbly, but religion can be defined in other ways besides “adherence to a particular sacred text.” Those more nuanced understandings go largely unaddressed.

I think I also was going in half expecting a diatribe against what’s lately been termed “identity politics,” but Appiah never goes that far, either. He does raise skepticism about appeals to diversity within political parties or companies, but never more than mild commentary as an aside to the larger point. I went in spoiling for a good debate and instead got an explanation of things that more or less aligned with the views I already had.

Instead, the most engaging parts for me came in the initial Classification chapter, where Appiah sets out a working definition of “identity” for the book and where he thinks identities fail. In his view, identity markers are a rough shorthand for group assignations we can sometimes choose for ourselves and that we sometimes have foisted upon us. If I’m a Muslim, I have a very clear idea about what it means for me to be a Muslim. I also have a clear idea about it means for other people to be a Muslim. At the same time, other people have their own ideas about what it means for someone to be a Muslim. So far so good, if slightly chaotic. But because individual ideas about “being Muslim” will never coalesce into a universally accepted definition, things collide. I might consider myself Muslim while other Muslims do not; someone can also consider me a Muslim when I’m not in reality.

This kind of sloppiness might be surmountable or at least tolerable on its own, but identities run into another thorny problem: essentialism. By this Appiah is referring to the philosophical idea of “essences,” that people (or things, or animals, or etc.) possess immutable, timeless qualities. Mash this up with identity labels, and this means that we think of any given identity marker as arising from an eternal and immutable characteristic of the person with said identity. To continue on the Muslim example, people tend to think (or to act and speak as if they think) there is a Muslim-ness that all Muslims share, that it is an eternal and immutable thing. Essentialism, Appiah theorizes, works more or less fine for simple concrete things like cups or chairs, but it can’t hold for identities. There’s too much variation, even contradiction, within any one group.

But even though essentialism is presented as the single most important reason to rethink identity, it’s only addressed head-on in the introductory chapter. Appiah refers back to it occasionally in later chapters, but not in any strong sense. If illustrating the inherent instability of identity labels was meant to be the argument against essentialism, I don’t think it’s a very convincing one.

This might be a problem where I’m expecting popular philosophy, or popular political science, to dig into a topic at an academic level. That’s simply not the job of a popular book aimed at a lay reader and the problem is my own expectations. If a book like The Lies That Bind is meant to be an introduction that inspires readers to seek out more robust texts, or even just to reconsider their own ideas, then that’s fantastic no matter what I think of it. After all, The Lies That Bind is also an interesting and engaging read. Appiah has a knack for effective framing devices and clear, concise explanations. Perhaps the fact that the book grew out of lectures also helped give it a light, conversational tone.

As someone described How to be an Anti-Capitalist in the 21st Century, it’s a good book to give to your centrist friend. But if you’re already convinced of the instability of identity markers then there’s not much new here for you.

The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism

I’m increasingly deliberate about the physical books I buy to add to my library these days. My bookstore browsing always involves me checking what’s available at the library before making a final purchase. And I make a final purchase more often than not! Just less impulsively. Bookstores function as an important randomizing factor in a world with algorithm-based recommendations. The human element is key.

A recent trip to The English Book Shop in Stockholm—which also reminded me that I had put Sister Outsider on my TBR—brought Naomi Klein’s The Shock Doctrine back to my attention. I’d seen it countless times in friends’ libraries, and Klein as a journalist was already familiar to me, but for whatever reason this was the moment where I decided to actually read one of her books. And as luck would have it, it was available in English from the Stockholm library.

The Shock Doctrine is a comprehensive look at the spread of Milton Friedman’s free market philosophy in the latter half of the twentieth century. I could list all of the case studies Klein takes up, but it would get long, fast. Suffice it to say that she draws on examples from all over the world. Her main thrust, however, is showing its most recent (at the time) application in the post-9/11 invasion of Iraq.

The distinctive element of Klein’s approach (compared to, say, The Jakarta Method) is her use of metaphor to frame her research: in this case, the gruesome techniques used by Donald Ewen Cameron in the Montreal experiments. The connection Klein repeatedly makes is that massive disaster (either man-made or natural) visited on an entire population is, if not the only, then the easiest or most direct way to traumatize a country enough to sneak in wildly unpopular changes—the ones she happened to focus on here with economic ones rooted in the Chicago school. Much like Cameron used electroshock therapy and other techniques in an attempt to turn his patients into blank slates upon which he thought he could rebuild them into healthy people, Klein argues, the US used the shock of these disasters to turn entire countries into blank slates upon which to build new highly privatized ultrafree market economies specifically to benefit the ultra wealthy (usually but not always located in the US). In other words, “disaster capitalism.”

She’s received criticism for this choice of metaphorical framing device, which isn’t entirely unwarranted I suppose, but personally I think the metaphor is an apt one. It allows Klein to highlight the common factors of a large number of disparate tragedies and make sense of the bigger picture and it’s also not entirely unrelated, considering how those electroshock techniques were often applied in the campaigns of violence Klein describes throughout the book. Fractal violence.

My only lingering thought, since this was published in 2007, is whether or not Klein’s attempt at optimism in the final chapter ended up being warranted. In what I assume was a deliberate choice in order to leave readers with a sense of hope for the future, she closes with developments in South America she feels will help create “shock-proof” countries and economies and lead to more just and equitable outcomes. This was a chapter written before Bolsonaro or Milei rose to power, obviously. Since there doesn’t appear to be an updated edition, for the moment I’ll just have to hunt down subsequent interviews and op-eds.

Sister Outsider

Audre Lorde is a name that’s been familiar to me for years, for better or for worse through people quoting her in well-designed little social media banners about poetry, the master’s tools dismantling the master’s house, or self care. There is something kind of sad and deflating in that: to generate a substantial body of artistic work as well as intellectual and theoretical thought, only to be reduced to the 21st century equivalent of a soundbite, lost in the stream of other reductionist soundbites.

The Sister Outsider essay collection came up in a podcast I was listening to—contextualizing Lorde a bit more beyond a neatly designed and typeset swipe-able image—and anyway, here we are now!

I actually finished the collection a few weeks ago; I just couldn’t find the time or brain to write about it until now. The short review that Sister Outsider doesn’t need is that it’s a fantastic collection. Lorde is a deep thinker and an engaging writer. I just wanted some of them to be longer, because there were lots of ideas and assertions that Lorde presents without cracking them open because they were always in service of some other, larger thesis, particularly in “Uses of the Erotic: the erotic as power.” Lorde uses a very nuanced and all-encompassing concept of “the erotic” that I was hoping she would examine more deeply and that I get the feeling she perhaps hashed out in other pieces not included in the book—like, I don’t immediately see the eroticism of constructing a bookshelf?

The diary accounts of visiting the Soviet Union and Grenada also stick out as personal favorites, maybe because those are more self-contained accounts of real-world events rather than out-of-context selections from longer, fuzzier academic conversations?

I’m also keenly aware that this is the rare piece of nonfiction by a Black author I’ve managed to read as an adult. Out of that nonfiction, almost all of them are either autobiographical or a treatment of race relations in the US. (I expect all of them are, but I’m hedging my bets here in case I’m wrong.) Obviously race relations, or whatever the best term is anymore, is important and one worth learning about. But I feel like surely Black journalists and academics are experts in a wide variety of fields, so why should the default expertise readily available to me be so limited? Offhand I can think of astronomy: Neil deGrasse Tyson, who has at least a couple of popular science books out by now, as does Maggie Aderin-Pocock.

Of course limiting this to English, to books published in the US or the UK, is another factor. Etc. I guess my point is, this is something I try to reflect on in my nonfiction choices: whose expertise do I have access to? Whose is marginalized? How can I broaden the knowledge pool available to me?

This Is an Uprising: How Nonviolent Revolt is Shaping the Twenty-First Century

A guest on an episode of one of my favorite podcasts a few years back mentioned Mark and Paul Engler’s This Is an Uprising and it went on to the TBR. I managed to find a copy at Judd Books during my trip to London this past summer, and recent events have made it seem especially relevant, or more relevant than usual.

This Is an Uprising is a handbook and history lesson in nonviolent revolt, looking at various twentieth century case studies through the lens of nonviolent protest theory and evaluating notable successes as well as failures. The Englers review the two traditional models of protest activism, organizational-based and movement-based, and then propose a third model that combines the strengths of both of them for the best possible outcomes: momentum-based. The Englers did their homework and there are a lot of references to names like Saul Alinsky, Gene Sharp, and Frances Fox Piven. (Which also meant that, despite clearing one book of my TBR, I’ve now added four others, but that’s what the best nonfiction always does.)

This was also a welcome counterweight to Weil’s meditations on force. The Englers devote a whole chapter to outlining what they call discipline, that is, the commitment of individuals and movements to nonviolence. They highlight how violence—which they specifically describe as “whatever the public perceives as violence”—makes widespread acceptance of a movement more difficult, and how violence is often the wedge that allows state-sponsored infiltrators to compromise groups. From local criticism of Black Bloc members in Occupy Oakland to FBI infiltrators hosting bomb-building workshops for environmental activists to the habit of guerilla fighters of installing yet another military dictatorship, the Englers make it clear that nonviolence is an essential part of the revolt they’re detailing. While there’s a lot of compelling evidence in This Is an Uprising for Weil’s argument that force eternally begets force, the book also shows that transcending force—often by tactically submitting to it in the hope of garnering support or changing public opinion—is achievable by more than just two or three people in the course of human history, and that it can have serious and long-lasting outcomes.

Could the tactics outlined in this book have worked against Hitler and the Nazi party, though?

I’m not convinced.

While the Englers did a fair job highlighting mixed successes or outright failures (and explaining them according to their failure to implement the most important principles of momentum-based activism), I don’t think they ever tackled the hardest possible cases. Situations where the status quo to be changed is the absolute bones of how our society runs, the underlying principles from which everything else springs.

The successful protests in here, even the most impressive case of Otpor and the ouster of Slobodan Milošević, were all leveraged against situations that can be considered something like social byproducts of the deeper, more entrenched forces guiding the world. I’ll be less cryptic and tip my political hand by more explicitly defining those “deeper, more entrenched” forces as “the profit motive of capitalism as it overlaps with the state.” Segregation and Jim Crow laws were not inherent cogs in the profit machine. Nor were there any obvious financial incentives to banning same-sex marriages or the callous treatment of HIV and AIDS patients. These are huge, important, material concerns for millions of individuals that can have serious, even life-or-death consequences, absolutely. I wouldn’t wish to suggest that they were unimportant. But at a higher level, one could make the argument that these issues were always political footballs at the end of the day, kicked back and forth to show allegiance to this or that team, means to the true end: acquiring and maintaining a hold on political power and wealth.

Think of the cynicism with which the Republican party made abortion a huge issue for American Christians so that they could ensure a reliable voting bloc for themselves and the ability to, not make any laws about abortion out of a fervent true belief, but to craft legislation and economic models that would keep wealth and power consolidated with an elite ruling class (with a few token abortion decisions here and there). A ruling class you could, for example, call “the 1%.” Abortion was and is rarely the endgame for many (most) Republican politicians, which is why no one should be surprised when the same Republican politicians urge their daughters or mistresses to seek out abortions if a child would be politically inexpedient. It’s just the means to an end. The minute they can’t use abortion as the same galvanizing topic to get sympathetic voters to the polls, they’ll drop it and pick something else. Abortion I guess is still on the table now, but segregation no longer is. (Weirdly, with the “your body, my choice” meme, it seems like abortion has mutated or grown to become, not necessarily a purely Christian thing, but also specifically a feminist backlash thing. But anyway.)

If a change in law or regime happens to align with peak protests, is that really a victory? Is it causation or merely correlation? I suppose, after all, that it takes exactly these kinds of nonviolent protests to shift public opinion in such a way as to make something like segregation or same-sex marriage bans so toxic that it’s political suicide to promote them. I guess my concern is: material as those concerns are to millions of people, does changing them really get to the heart of what’s going wrong at the top? Are we just condemned to constantly putting out forest fires of different forms of social oppression (see: the explosion in discussions on trans rights) as long as elites remain addicted to wealth and power? Are we treating symptoms rather than the disease?

Maybe I’m wrong. Maybe Otpor’s successful overthrow of Milošević is an example of what could have happened earlier on in 1930s Germany if the right people with the right ideas had deployed the right tactics. But while I appreciate the inherent optimism of This Is an Uprising, I worry that there is a limit to the success of the model the Englers are proposing.